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Abstract
We consider borrowers with the opportunity to raise funds from a competitive
banking sector that shares information, and from an alternative hidden lender. The
presence of the hidden lender allows borrowers to conceal poor results from their banks
and, thus, restricts the contracts that can be obtained from the banking sector and
reduces welfare. In equilibrium, some borrowers obtain funds from both the banking
sector and the ine¢ cient hidden lender simultaneously; cross-subsidies arise between
di¤erent borrowers and this leads to too little liquidation. Imposing distributional
assumptions, we fully characterize outcomes and show that as the cost of borrowing
from the hidden lender increases, total welfare increases. We generalize the model to
allow for a partially hidden lender and obtain qualitatively similar results.
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1 Introduction
Small and large rms face a rang of debt-nancing options including private placements,
securitized loans, trade credit, and personal loans to the owner. Similarly, households
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have many potential sources of available credit, including secured mortgages, installment
loans, bank overdrafts, store credit, credit cards, payday loans, borrowing from family, and
borrowing from informalsources.
An empirical puzzle is that borrowers appear to borrow from apparently costly lenders
without fully exhausting cheaper sources. Small businesses often use uncollateralized trade
credit and personal loans to the owner when collateral and collateralized loans are available.
On the consumer side, Gross and Souleles (2002), for example, report that in a large sample
of credit card holders, almost 70% percent of those borrowing on bankcards have positive
housing equity. Finally, there is both theoretical work and empirical evidence of formal and
informal sources of credit coexisting in developing countries (Bell et al, 1997; Bose, 1998;
Jain, 1999). In these cases, where some people simultaneously borrow from both sources,
it is unclear whether borrowers are rationed by the formal sector before they access the
informal one.1
We suggest that an important consideration in understanding this puzzle is that while
some lenders perfectly share information about borrowers,other kinds of lenders can be
totally hidden from the perspective of the main lender to the rm.2 For other types of
lenders, information may be available, but it may be costly to access and, thus, is updated
infrequently (for example, at the end of the scal year only).3 This allows borrowers
the chance to conceal liquidity shocks that a¤ect their creditworthiness by borrowing from
junior lenders whose loans are hard for senior lenders to observe. Thus, even when seniority
is well dened, a senior lender cares about the existence of junior lenders because the
possibility that the borrower is using them a¤ects the information obtained through interim
1While some of this literature posits a tradeo¤ between an informal sector, with better information about
borrowersabilities to repay, and a formal sector with a lower cost of capital, the information available to
the informal lender does not play any role in our model.
2Note that other explanations have been posited to explain this apparent puzzle; for example, Laibson
et al. (2003) calibrate a model of life-cycle borrowing with time-inconsistent preferences, and Haliassos and
Reiter (2003) discuss a model of separate mental accounts. The results of this paper need not contradict
such explanations, but can be seen as complementary to them. While our results (as with any model that
assumes fully rational consumers) fail to explain the coexistence of credit card debt and liquid assets, they
can be seen as suggesting some endogenous illiquidity of certain assets.
3Note, also, that restrictions such as privacy protection laws have precluded the creation of credit
bureaus in countries like France. Furthermore, the existence of cheap-to-access and centralized public
credit registers (that do not cover borrowing sources such as small credits, credit cards or consumer credit)
have also crowded out the creation of credit bureaus (See Japelli and Pagano (2000) on both issues and
for a good overview on information sharing in banking). See, also, Calem and Mester (1995) for evidence
that credit bureaus may be less reliable than privately collected information. For further information on
consumer credit reporting in the U.S. and further references on both the theory and development of credit
bureaus and reporting institutions, see Hunt (2006).
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repayments.
As an example, missing a repayment can trigger a renegotiation with the bank and
lead to a higher future interest rate. This reects the banks renewed assessment of the
borrowers ability to repay. An e¤ort to renegotiate the loan may well be costly for the
borrower because of the information revealed in the process.4 This can be interpreted as
an endogenous renegotiation cost.
In order to avoid this penalty, an entrepreneur might borrow from elsewhere, taking
a personal loan, for example, to conceal the bad news that her enterprise has su¤ered a
liquidity shock. In turn, this makes missing a payment even worse news as it reects a
liquidity shock so large that it is prohibitively costly to conceal. The entrepreneurs oppor-
tunity to borrow from a source that the bank does not observe increases this informational
penalty and leads to higher renegotiation costs. The resulting overall cost of renegotiation
may be su¢ ciently high that the nancier would repossess the asset or foreclose following
a missed payment.
We illustrate these ideas more formally in a two-period model, where heterogeneous
borrowers can access two sources of funds: a competitive banking sector that shares in-
formation, and an opaque lending sector. Banks are senior claimants and seek to obtain
information regarding borrowers through interim payments. While most of our discussion
views banks as providing exible long-term (two-period) nancing, one could also interpret
the banking sector as providing a sequence of short-term loans.
Our principal results are that, in the absence of the opaque sector, realized contracts
are complex menus, in which higher levels of interim payments lead to lower nal payments.
This takes into account not only that less is owed, but also that a higher interim payment
reects that the borrower is less of a credit risk.5 However, with a viable alternative hidden
lender, a borrower might be tempted to borrow from that source in order to disguise her
type. This possibility is anticipated by the original lender in the banking sector. In general,
this will lead to a more limited menu of repayment schedules in the optimal contract.
Further, some borrowers borrow from the opaque sector to make this payment. Thus,
in equilibrium, these borrowers are simultaneously borrowing from both the banking and
the opaque sectors. Further, since information is supressed and so banks cannot easily
4We focus in the model on the case where this e¤ect is indirect in the inference that the bank draws.
A similar analysis arises if missing a payment leads the bank to access additional information about other
loans taken up since the extension of the original loan.
5This result mirrors the observation in Allen (1985) that long-term contracts allow interim payments to
provide information.
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distinguish good and bad projects, liquidation decisions are ine¢ cient and some projects
continue for longer than they should.
The model also sheds some light on recent trends in consumer credit markets. Inso-
far as information about consumersborrowing positions with other lenders is increasingly
available, banks can o¤er loans that are more contingent on repayment paths and downpay-
ments. This would correspond in our model to the case in which there is no hidden lender,
or the hidden lender is su¢ ciently di¢ cult or costly to observe. However, when this
information is not available rationing and inexible loans with rigid repayment schedules
prevail
We impose a distributional assumption that types are uniformly distributed, which
allows us to fully characterize equilibrium, and, in that case, we can show that the unique
equilibrium results in only a single level of interim payment observed in the banking sector.
We consider how the welfare of consumers and the transparent sector vary with the
cost of borrowing from the opaque source. In particular, a lower cost of borrowing ben-
ets consumers for a xed level of borrowing, but it also encourages a greater number of
ine¢ cient types to continue to borrow rather than terminate the debt contract, leading to
changes in the prevailing contracts in the transparent sector. Overall welfare falls.
A key element of the model is that a lender may not perfectly observe all the loans
that a borrower may hold. Empirically, this is certainly the case. For example, although
information sharing takes place through credit bureaus, there are many lenders who choose
neither to pay for access to credit bureaus nor to provide information to them. Trade credit,
informal, black-market lending, and personal loans to entrepreneurs subsequently used in
their rms are clear examples. Further examples include consumer credit, store credit,
payday lenders and other sources that do not participate in formal information-gathering
credit bureaus, both in developing countries and elsewhere, both currently and historically.6
Even when a lender has access to a credit bureau, the costs associated with accessing and
processing the relevant information may lead lenders to obtain and use this information
only in particular circumstances. Such circumstances would include the loan-approval
stage, missed payments, and renegotiation; otherwise, there is unlikely to be continual
monitoring. In this paper, we simply take it for granted that some types of borrowing are
6For example, in the US, payday lenders do not share information with banks (Elliehausen & Lawrence,
2001; Mann & Hawkins 2007). However it has been shown that their presence alters the borrowerspayment
policies with respect to other loans. In particular mortgage delinquency after an aggregate liquidity shock
is signicantly lower in areas where there are payday lenders (Morse 2007)
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not commonly observed by all lenders.
The banking sector cannot write contracts that make payments depend on the amount
borrowed from the hidden lender. This is a natural consequence of the assumption that the
banking sector cannot observe borrowing from the hidden lender. This paper is, therefore,
related to a growing literature on non-exclusive contracts and hidden savings. Our model
di¤ers from this literature in a number of respects and in its motivation. In particular,
we consider di¤erent lending sectors that vary in the information that they have. Further,
we consider borrowers who can simultaneously borrow from them and lenders who face an
adverse selection problem. This contrasts with models that concentrate on moral hazard
problems, either with simultaneous borrowing (Bisin, and Guaitoli, 2004) or with sequential
access to loans (Bizer and DeMarzo, 1992) and with lenders who are ex-ante identical.
Other papers in the literature on exclusivity focus on insurance (Allen, 1985; Arnott and
Stiglitz, 1991; and Cole and Kocherlakota, 2001), whereas we model agents to be risk-
neutral with limited liability, and we focus on borrowing.
Our analysis includes varying the cost of borrowing from the hidden source.7 Allen
(1985) and others focus on the case where this cost is equal to the social planners rate.
Innes (1990), in order to generate monotonicity in repayment schedules, considers the case
where money can be repaid immediately so that the cost of borrowing is essentially zero.
Section 2 of this paper introduces the model and elaborates the key assumptions. In
Section 3, we solve for the equilibrium and characterize the principal results; in particular,
we highlight and distinguish results that are distribution-free and discuss comparative
statics with respect to the cost of borrowing from the opaque sector. Then, we assume a
uniform distribution for the borrower´s type in order to fully characterize equilibria and
show their implications for welfare. In Section 4, briey discuss an extension to the case
where borrowing from the opaque sector can be observed with some probability. The nal
section concludes.
2 The Model
Although the underlying economic mechanisms have wider applicability, we focus the model
on the particular example of a small business that is raising funds for a capital investment.
The rm has access to both a competitive banking sector and a hidden lender. One can
7The general model of Doepke and Townsend (2004), as illustrated in their example in Section 7.1, allows
for this more general interest rate; however, as in Cole and Kocherlakota (2001) and Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2003), they consider hidden saving and insurance rather than hidden borrowing and focus on numerical
rather than analytical solutions.
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think of the hidden lender as a personal loan to the entrepreneur secretly diverted to the
rm.
The model can be extended to cover other related forms of lending. For example, some
creditors (e.g., a small rms suppliers) are observable to the nancial sector at the end
of the scal year but not on a continuous basis. Covering such a case would require small
changes in the model. For tractability, we concentrate on a single example and extend it
in Section 4 to partially hidden borrowing that is detected with some probability.
We rst present the basic set-up, timing, and structure of the model. We then introduce
additional assumptions that rule out uninteresting cases and simplify the analysis of the
model.
2.1 Set-up
We introduce a two-period model to consider the interaction between alternative sources
of borrowing: a transparent banking sector and an opaque hidden lending sector. In the
transparent sector, credit is provided by a continuum of agents that we call banks. Banks
are risk-neutral deep pockets, and there is competition among them. Banks share infor-
mation, and so the borrowing position of any borrower with a bank is perfectly observable
and veriable among all banks. We normalize the gross riskless market interest rate of
this formal sector to one. The principal assumptions about the banking sector can be
summarized as follows:
Assumption 1: The total amount of loanable funds in the banking sector exceeds de-
mand.
Assumption 2: A borrower can repay her outstanding balance and switch to another
bank at any point in time.
Assumption 3: Banks perfectly share the information about the borrowers outstanding
loans.
These assumptions guarantee both that banks do not make a prot, on average, and
that conditional on the information known at any point in time, every contract o¤ered must
break even. In short, there can be no observable cross-subsidies between borrowers. If a
set of borrowers knew and were able to prove to a third party that they were subsidizing
other borrowers, they would switch to another bank, leaving their previous bank with only
subsidized borrowers and, thus, losses.8 Note that we assume that banks are committed
8Note that the assumption of perfect competition within the banking sector is not crucial for our results.
If there were small costs in switching banks, for example, in the absence of an opaque sector, banks would
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to sharing information. In particular, this implies that they cannot simply replicate the
hidden lender as they have no means to hide such contracts from other banks.
In addition to the transparent banking sector, we introduce an alternative opaque
lending sector that lends at a at repayment rate r (r > 1); this rate is composed of
the endogenous break-even rate plus an additional markup  per unit borrowed.9 The
introduction of this exogenous additional markup can be justied as arising from alternative
uses of the hidden source or a relative ine¢ ciency of the hidden lender in obtaining funds or
processing loans. It allows us to show some interesting comparative statics on the relative
ine¢ ciency of the hidden lender. A situation in which the hidden lender is fully e¢ cient
( close to 0) is, therefore, a particular case of the characterized equilibria.
A key feature of this alternative borrowing source is that it does not share information
with the rest of the nancial system. That is, the borrowing position of any borrower in the
opaque sector is not observable by banks. Further, we model the opaque sector as a junior
lender. This is certainly consistent with an interpretation as a concealed loan from the
rm owner to the rm.10 In our model, lenders exogenously belong to either the banking
sector or the opaque sector. Japelli and Pagano (1993) discuss determinants of belonging
to either group as an endogenous decision.
Demand for funds comes from entrepreneurs who require these funds for an investment
project and who are heterogeneous in the quality of their projects. They are risk-neutral
and maximize total consumption across periods. These assumptions may not be crucial for
the qualitative insights; however, they are convenient in characterizing a unique equilibrium
outcome.
The timing of the model is as follows:
At t = 0, each borrower does not know her type. In order to raise D units of funding
necessary to invest in the project, the borrower can costlessly search across banks for a
menu of rst- and associated second-period debt repayment schedules fp; q(p)g. Second-
period payments may be contingent on rst-period ones.11
o¤er contracts that are contingent on type (although not fully contingent). The introduction of a hidden
sector would still lead to less-contingent contracts and reduce welfare.
9The endogenous break-even rate of a competitive and e¢ cient lending sector is always equal to  1
(regardless of the contract signed with the main lender), as discussed in the paragraph preceding Section
3.1 on page 11.
10 In terms of seniority, it is also consistent with trade credit or credit cards. Other types of hidden
lending, including black-market lending, may be more ambiguous with respect to seniority.
11Note that costless search and a competitive banking sector is outcome-equivalent to the borrower having
full bargaining power and proposing the schedule to a single bank.
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At t = 12 , each borrower learns the type of her project, which is parametrized by ,
where  is distributed on [0; 1]. At this point, the borrower can either liquidate the project
and fully repay the loan or continue with the project.12
At t = 1, borrowers realize a cash ow  that corresponds to their type. They can
choose to borrow d from the informal lending source. The informal lender is junior to the
bank loan, and banks do not observe d. Borrowers can use these funds to either consume or
choose one of the repayment schedules from the menu and repay p to the bank. Borrowers
consume anything left over, so residual income cannot be used to repay future debts.
Note that  is neither observable nor veriable in Period 1, and it need not be in Period
2 if the project is successful. We do assume, however, that if the project fails, triggering
liquidation and investigation, it becomes veriable. Introducing a small verication cost in
Period 2, in the spirit of the costly state verication literature (Townsend, 1979; Gale and
Hellwig, 1985), would not a¤ect the qualitative results.
At t = 2, the project is successful and delivers B+ with probability . Otherwise, the
project fails and delivers only . In both cases, seniority of debt is such that the borrower
repays q(p) to the bank rst and then repays opaque lenders up to rd. The borrower
consumes all the remaining funds.
The parameter  represents the creditworthiness of the borrower since the expected
nal cash ow of the project is positively correlated with its interim cash ow. Note that,
overall, a project of type  generates  D+ + (B + ) + (1  ) =  D+ B + 2. In
particular, the worst potential project, a project of type  = 0, generates y  B  D in
expectation.13 It is convenient to dene z  1 + (B  D)=2 as a measure related to the
average protability of a project. Low values of z suggest that the worst potential project
is ine¢ cient and, further (though depending somewhat on the distribution), that a high
proportion of projects is ine¢ cient. In particular, z  0 implies that no projects should
be funded, while z  1 implies that all projects are e¢ cient and should be funded. With
intermediate values of z, only projects with   1  z are e¢ cient.
Notation is summarized in Appendix B. The following diagram summarizes both the
borrowers actions and the payo¤s required and generated by the investment project.
12We model this option to stop the project as a costless liquidation in a very early stage or even before
investment has taken place; but supposing that the agent was able to recover a su¢ ciently large salvage
value at an early stage would generate similar qualitative results.
13Equivalently, y can be interpreted as the part of the returns of the project that is common to all types
of borrowers.
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Borrowers and lenders are risk-neutral, and every agent seeks to maximize the sum of
her rst- and second-period incomes.
This concludes the set-up of the model which contains the basic elements required to
consider the implications of hidden borrowing for the structure of formal lending contracts.
In particular, borrowers must be heterogeneous; there must be two periods in order that
interim payo¤s play a role, and there must be some possibility of default for the borrowers
type to have any meaningful consequences.
2.2 Further Assumptions
In this section, we add three auxiliary assumptions that help to simplify the analysis. The
rst assumption ensures that contracts are renegotiation-proof. The second assumption
precludes unlimited borrowing. The nal assumption imposes parametric restrictions that
rule out uninteresting cases.
Assumption 4: Banks weakly prefer renegotiation-proof contracts.
In the absence of Assumption 4, more general contracts could arise in period 0, but
renegotiation would lead to the same outcomes characterized by the model. Banks could
o¤er any repayment schedule that guarantees a break-even interest rate in the rst period
and then, in view of the information revealed by p, renegotiate at t = 1 to the a new
interest rate so that there would be nothing to tie down second-period repayments in an
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o¤ered contract.14 The outcomes and payo¤s under renegotiated and renegotiation-proof
contracts are identical, so the role of Assumption 4 is to emphasize the long-term nature
of the contract.
Lemma 1 : An equilibrium menu of repayment schedules fp; q(p)g is renegotiation proof
and breaks even at all future possible stages.
Proof. Competition between banks ensures that banks break even at the ex-ante stage.
Assumption 4 guarantees that the initial menu is already contingent on all the future
public information on the borrowers type, so borrowers will e¤ectively not switch (or
renegotiate on the threat of switching) to another bank.
We make the following assumption that ensures that the entrepreneur does not borrow
in order to nance current consumption, but borrows only for the sake of investment.
Assumption 5: A borrower cannot owe more than she can possibly repay in the best
possible state.
This assumption can be understood as a no fraudcondition. For example, it might
be appropriate if borrowers could be punished beyond limited liability if it were found
(perhaps with some probability) that they did not intend to repay in any possible state of
the world. This is a sensible borrowing limit since most legal systems allow for punishment
above limited liability (i.e., prison or personal liability) whenever a borrower takes a loan
that she does not intend to repay even in the best possible situation.
Assumption 5 ensures that borrowing from the hidden source in order to consume will
not occur. Borrowing from the hidden sector to consume and repay in the good state is
ine¢ cient. Therefore, borrowing to consume would be worthwhile only if the borrower
intended to default for sure, and Assumption 5 precludes this possibility. Note, however,
that in the results characterized below, this borrowing limit is not binding, and so although
it is signicant in ruling out borrowing for the sake of consumption, it plays no further role
in the characterization of the equilibrium.15
14The renegotiation-proof condition is e¤ectively equivalent to an exclusivity-proof contract that is, a
contract that guarantees that at any point in time the borrower does not want to switch to another bank
(in this sense, the contracts are exclusive proof between banks, as in Rampini and Bisin 2006).
15Even though the no fraud condition leads to a di¤erent borrowing limit across borrowers, banks
cannot use this to separate them, forcing them to reach this limit on their rst payment p. As p increases,
the second payment q becomes negative before reaching the borrowing limit, giving the borrowers additional
borrowing capacity. Therefore, if hidden borrowing is used only for concealment purposes, the no fraud
condition is never binding. It can only bind if the purpose of borrowing is consumption.
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Finally, we make parametric restrictions that preclude some trivial and uninteresting
cases.
Assumption 6: D > 2 and 0 < z < 1
The rst restriction ensures that no borrower can repay for sure; the second restric-
tion ensures that all types of borrowers will default to a di¤erent extent if the project is
unsuccessful (so, from the point of view of lenders, they really are di¤erent types) and, in
particular, some projects are e¢ cient and some are not.
3 Equilibrium
The feasible strategies for the banks are menus of repayment schedules fp; q(p)g at t = 0.
The borrower chooses which o¤er to accept, if any. If the borrower refuses all o¤ers, the
game ends; otherwise, having accepted an o¤er, the borrower has to decide whether to
pursue the project at t = 12 or to liquidate. Finally, the borrower has to decide which
schedule and requisite rst payment from the menu to choose, funding any shortfall for the
rst payment through borrowing from the hidden source.
In order to characterize the equilibrium, we can draw on the revelation principle at
t = 1 and think of the borrowers choice from the menu fp; q(p)g as a function of her
type that is, we could think of o¤ering a menu fp(); q()g. As discussed above, in
Lemma 1, any meaningful contract on the menu that is, any contract that is ever taken
up in equilibrium will break even at each stage of the contract and so will not contain
any observable cross-subsidies. Since there is competition among banks, the equilibrium
menu will maximize the ex-ante welfare of consumers. Finally, associated with each of the
payments that are ever made in equilibrium, incentive compatibility must be satised (that
is, once a borrower has learned her type , she prefers to pay p() rather than any other
p(0)).
The equilibrium conguration crucially depends on whether the interest rate at which
the informal sector lends r is above or below the threshold 2  . We separate these two
cases in the discussion that follows.
Throughout, the exogenous interest rate r can be thought of as a measure of the degree
of ine¢ ciency of the opaque sector. The break-even rate for r is 1 , and this would be
the endogenous rate for the opaque sector if there were no other frictions or ine¢ ciencies.
Regardless of the amount borrowed, the opaque lender will always be repaid if the good
state is realized and will always face default in the bad state.16 Therefore, r = 1 is
16This follows from the seniority of bank debt, the size of the project, and Assumption 5. Note that this
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indeed the endogenous optimal interest rate when the hidden lender is e¢ cient. However,
whether we think of the opaque lender as trade credit, a credit card, personal loans to
an entrepreneur, or an informal lender, it is reasonable to believe that the interest rate
charged could be above this break-even rate if, for example, there are other uses or users
of this source of lending. We, therefore, study situations in which r > 1 and allow for the
possibility that the hidden lender may charge a markup  > 0 over the break-even rate;
therefore, r = 1 + . We assume that this markup is strictly positive, but allow it to be
arbitrarily close to zero. This is equivalent to assuming that  could be equal to zero, but
borrowers weakly prefer bank loans.
3.1 Very ine¢ cient informal sector
In this section, we explore the implications of a very ine¢ cient opaque sector. In particular,
we explore the resulting equilibrium when  > 1   that is, when the interest rate r is
bigger than 2  . We begin by characterizing an equilibrium where there is full separation
among those types that borrow that is, each di¤erent type repays the formal sector a
di¤erent interim payment, and there is no borrowing from the opaque sector. We then go
on to briey discuss other equilibria.
Proposition 1 When the opaque sector lends at a su¢ ciently high interest rate ( r > 2  ),
then there exists a fully separating equilibrium where all banks o¤er the same equilibrium
contract fp(); q()g sets the interim payment equal to the rst period cashow p() = 
and the corresponding nal payment q() = D  (1 ) . All types  < 1   z liquidate at
t = 12 .
Proof. The banksequilibrium beliefs are consistent with borrower behaviour that is,
banks believe that a type that pays p =  is an -type (note that some types will simply
prefer to liquidate at the t = 12 stage).
This fully contingent contract has to fulll the break-even and incentive-compatibility
conditions.
The break-even condition, given that the rst payment p =  reveals the type of the
borrower as , is that D = + q + (1  ), so that in expectation the bank recovers its
investment. This determines that the break-even second payment is q = D p (1 )p .
is independent of the type of the project, and this is precisely the reason why the information held by the
hidden lender is irrelevant to our analysis, as the hidden lender cannot gain from conditioning on the main
loan size or its payments.
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We analyze the incentive-compatibility condition by considering two deviations: imi-
tating a lower type and imitating a higher type.
Incentive-compatibility condition 1: The contract needs to guarantee that no borrower
wants to imitate a lower-quality borrower. Suppose that a borrower of quality  claims to
be a lower-quality borrower 0 <  by paying a rst payment p = 0; in that case, her total
utility would be (  0) + (B   D 0 (1 )0 + ). Note that (  0) is the additional
consumption at t = 1 from reporting a lower type, while (B   D 0 (1 )0 + ) is the
net consumption in the good state (which occurs with probability ) after repaying q(0).
Instead, by revealing her own type, she would get (B   D  (1 ) + ). The di¤erence
between these two terms is  (1  )(  0) < 0, and so it cannot be optimal to claim to
be a borrower of a lower type.
Incentive-compatibility condition 2: The contract also needs to guarantee that no bor-
rower wants to imitate a higher-quality borrower by borrowing from the hidden source and
paying a rst payment p > : Suppose, for contradiction, that a borrower claims to be
a higher-quality borrower by paying a rst payment p = 00 >  and borrowing 00   
from the hidden source to fund this payment. The total utility of the borrower would be
(B   D 00 (1 )00   r(00   ) + ) instead of (B   D  (1 ) + ). The di¤erence
between the two is:
(2     r)(00   ) (1)
which is negative if and only if r > 2  , so this is the necessary and su¢ cient condition
for this incentive-compatibility condition to hold.
Notice that o¤-equilibrium beliefs only apply to an attempt to repay p > 1 (if consumers
strictly preferred such a possibility and there was no loss involved, then the perfectly
competitive banking sector would o¤er it). However, even assigning the most optimistic
beliefs to such o¤ers (that is,  = 1), borrowers prefer their equilibrium contracts.
Lemma 2 The above equilibrium achieves rst best.
Proof. In the rst best, a borrower should be funded if and only if she generates su¢ cient
expected revenues that is, if and only if  + v(B + ) + (1   )  0. This is precisely
the marginal borrower in the equilibrium described above.
Note that since the absence of an opaque sector is equivalent to one where the cost of
borrowing is innitely large, it is a trivial corollary of Lemma 2 that the rst best can be
achieved if there is no opaque sector.
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Formally, beyond the equilibrium described in Proposition 1, there are many other
essentially observationally equivalent equilibria in the sense that many other redundant
(p; q(p)) schedules could be included in the o¤ered menu that are never taken up and that
have no e¤ect on outcomes (for example, schedules with very high ps and qs), or where
some banks (that in any case, earn no expected prots) o¤er menus that are never taken
up. Henceforth, we ignore such equilibria.
To summarize this section, when the hidden lender is su¢ ciently ine¢ cient, borrow-
ers do not attempt to conceal low interim cashows and do not borrow from the hidden
lender. The resulting bank contract is exible and allows for di¤erent rst payments with
corresponding nal payments. An alternative interpretation for the schedule of possible
payments is to suppose, instead, that only one contract from the schedule is initially agreed
upon, but that the contract is renegotiated following the cashow realization in the interim
period. The exibility, under this interpretation, would, therefore, reect low (endogenous)
costs of renegotiation.
3.2 Relatively E¢ cient Informal Sector
In the previous section, we supposed that the opaque sector was so ine¢ cient, or, equiva-
lently, that the cost of borrowing from the opaque sector was so high, that it had no e¤ect
on outcomes and on the contracts taken up in the transparent sector. In this section, we
explore the equilibrium outcome when the opaque sector is more e¢ cient that is when
 < 1  or, equivalently whenever r <
2 
 . Note in particular, that this regime includes
the case where there are no frictions in the opaque sector and  is arbitrarily close to 0.17
In the proof of Proposition 1, we argued that in the case where types were fully separated
in their payments and paid exactly their period 1 incomes, no type (at this interim stage)
would want to imitate a higher type if and only if r  2  . In particular, this implies that
the outcomes described in Proposition 1 can no longer be an equilibrium. Even though a full
characterization of the equilibrium when r < 2  requires specication of the distribution
of types, we can still describe some general features of any existing equilibria. In particular,
we can determine that there will be some pooling among di¤erent types of borrowers with
regard to their interim payments. Further, banks are not able to distinguish the di¤erent
types within a pool; it follows that there will be some cross subsidization between borrowers
17Note that the proof for the distribution-free results (Lemmas 1 and 3 and Proposition 2) do not rely
on the value of ; formally, the proofs of other results suppose that  > 0. It is trivial to show, however,
that when  = 0, the contract characterized is an equilibrium and there can be no more e¢ cient one.
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and, therefore, liquidation decisions might be ine¢ cient. Ine¢ cient liquidation implies that
rst best is not attained. Before we present a more formal characterization of the outcome
when r < 2  , we provide a preliminary result on the weak monotonicity of payments
with respect to type. Then we are able to show in Proposition 2 that individual separation
cannot be achieved.
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity of p) For every type  >  that does not liquidate, p()  p().
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma states that higher types do not make lower interim repayments than lower
types. The proof follows by contradiction: if such a contract were an equilibrium, then
it seems natural that there is no cost for a lower type to mimic a higher type by paying
less in the interim period (and possibly cutting the interim repayment will save on costly
borrowing from the hidden sector). Formally, the result is proved by examining the relevant
incentive-compatibility constraints. The following result then emerges as a corollary of the
Lemma.
Corollary 1 (Continuity of p) For every three borrowers with types , , and  such that
 >  >  where p() = p(), it must be the case that p() = p() = p().
Proof. p()  p() and p()  p() by Lemma 3, since p() = p() these must hold with
equality.
These two results allow us to prove the following Proposition.
Proposition 2 When r < 2  , there cannot be an equilibrium where a continuum of
borrowers are able to fully separate.
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that following the logic of the proof of Proposition 1, it seems clear that when
the cost of borrowing is low enough, it cannot be the case that all types of borrowers
can fully separate. Proposition 2 (and combined with Corollary 1) says a little more than
this: specically, that the borrowerstypes can be partitioned, with each pool of borrowers
paying a di¤erent interim payment. Again, underlying the proof of this result are the
incentive constraints of borrowers to choose the appropriate schedule from the menu. By
characterizing each of the incentive constraints (imitating a borrower of a higher type or
imitating a borrower of a lower type) in di¤erent cases, we complete the proofs. The
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intuition here is again a natural one if in some region two similar types can fully separate;
by borrowing a little from the hidden lender, the lower type can mimic the higher and
be better o¤ overall.
The reason why a contract like the one shown in Proposition 1 cannot be sustained is
also intuitive. Under that contract, banks are able to fully separate borrowers and, given
that banks break even at all times, this determines that the payo¤ of imitating a higher-
type borrower is 2  per extra unit paid at t = 1. The intuition for this payo¤ value is as
follows. By paying an additional unit at t = 1, the outstanding balance is reduced by 1
unit, and the perceived expected liquidation value of the rm (paid with probability 1  v)
is increased by another unit, so the overall expected value of repayment when the rm does
not default has to fall by 1+(1  v). Given that the rm does not default with probability
, the outstanding debt of the rm to be repaid at t = 2 must go down by 2  , otherwise
banks would make prots in equilibrium. Whenever the interest rate of the hidden lender
is below that threshold, lower types of borrowers would imitate higher types by borrowing
from the hidden source. Proposition 2 rules out that the incentive-compatibility conditions
can be fullled for any contract that achieves full separation. Therefore, by contradiction,
such a contract cannot exist.
We can further characterize properties of any equilibrium contract. In particular, we
determine that the marginal borrower that does not liquidate cannot be consuming after
making its rst payment. Let l denote the type that is just indi¤erentbetween liquidating
and continuing the project with the (p(l); q(l)) repayment schedule that corresponds to the
lowest pool of borrowers.
Proposition 3 The lowest type borrower that does not lidquidate does not consume in the
interim period that is, l  p(l).
Proof. By contradiction. Conditional on l > p, the utility of the indi¤erent borrower l
can be expressed as (B q(l)+ l+(l p(l))). Given that liquidating provides utility equal
to zero and that the borrower is indi¤erent, this implies that
(B + l   q(l) + (l   p(l))) = 0. (2)
As l > p, then (l  p(l)) > 0. This implies jointly with (2) that B + l  q(l) < 0, which
violates Assumption 5.
Propositions 2 and 3 imply that when r < 2  , if there exists an equilibrium, it must
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be one in which all borrowers belong to some pool. That is, no borrower is able to fully
separate.18 This means, necessarily, that there will be some cross-subsidies from the best
borrowers in each pool to the worst borrowers in each pool. Given that these subsidies will
exist in the bottom pool of borrowers who decide to invest, liquidation decisions will not
be e¢ cient and rst best will not be achieved.
This is an important result of the model. The presence of a relatively e¢ cient hidden
lender restricts the contractual options of the bank, forcing the contract to be less contin-
gent on intermediate payments. As the interest rate of the hidden lender falls, banks nd
it harder to distinguish between borrowers. Within a pool of indistinguishable borrow-
ers, the interest rates between t = 1 and t = 2 are the same for all borrowers, regardless
of their e¤ective creditworthiness. Higher-quality borrowers cross-subsidize lower-quality
borrowers. This is true in all possible pools of borrowers and, in particular, in the bottom
pool of borrowers who do not liquidate their projects. Therefore, this leads to ine¢ cient
liquidation policies, with too few projects being liquidated.
3.3 Full Characterization
We continue to consider the case in which the hidden lender is relatively e¢ cient, that is,
where r  2  . To progress and give a full characterization of equilibrium, we introduce a
specic distributional assumption.
Assumption 7:   U [0; 1]
We maintain this assumption throughout the remainder of the paper. Proposition
3 guarantees that any distribution would lead to all the borrowers belonging to some
pool. The uniform distribution allows for a tractable full characterization of equilibria.
Moreover, the assumption that consumer types are uniformly distributed emphasizes the
forces described above, insofar as it leads to full pooling: all types that borrow from the
transparent sector will choose the same contract from the schedule. In equilibrium, only
one level of repayment to the transparent sector will be observed. Rather than the menu
of contracts actually taken up in the Section 3.1, borrowing from the transparent sector
will entail the same payment p at t = 1 for all types who have not liquidated and the
same remaining debt q due at t = 2 (which will be fully repaid in the good state and only
partially repaid depending on type in the bad state).
Proposition 4 When the lending rate from the hidden sector is su¢ ciently low (r  2  ),
18Note, however, that we cannot rule out the existence of multiple pools.
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all borrowers who do not liquidate pay the same interim payment p() = p and owe the
same amount, q, to the bank in period 2.
The proof, which appears in the Appendix, has a simple structure. We conjecture
that there must be at least two types that make di¤erent interim payments and nd
a contradiction. We focus on the highest two payments (and, by Lemma 3, these will
correspond to the highest di¤ering types). We nd that borrowers, at the ex-ante stage
when the menus are determined, would prefer that the top two pools be combined as a
single pool, in order to maximize their anticipated surplus. It is at that stage that we use
the distributional assumption on types since it allows to quantify the ex-ante (at period 0)
surplus. The uniform distribution helps in keeping this part of the analysis simple.
Since banks are perfectly competitive, the equilibrium outcome will indeed maximize
their surplus and so combine these top two pools. An induction argument for a nite
number of pools will imply that one overall pool appears as the equilibrium contract.19
There are a number of di¤erent cases that must be considered (depending on the level of p
and the size of the pools), but working through each of them is relatively straightforward.
Proposition 4 states that the equilibrium contract has only one possible rst payment
p and a second payment q that makes the bank break even on average, given the pool
of borrowers who do not liquidate. In particular, the proposition shows that there is no
way by which higher types can e¢ ciently separate from lower types. This implies some
cross-subsidies from higher to lower types of borrowers and, therefore, involves ine¢ cient
liquidation decisions, as above. This fully characterizes the structure of the equilibrium;
however, to gain further insight and, in particular, to analyze welfare, we proceed by
precisely calculating the values of p and q, and the equilibrium liquidation policy.
3.3.1 Equilibrium payments and welfare
In this section, we characterize the liquidation policy. We then dene welfare. In equilib-
rium, since borrowers accept contracts before knowing their types and the banking sector
is competitive, total welfare will be maximized. We conclude by characterizing this maxi-
mized value.
We begin by restating our notation to discuss the liquidation policy. Recall that l
denotes the type that is just indi¤erentbetween liquidating and continuing the project
with the (p; q) repayment schedule. Under perfect information, l = 1  z; however, limited
19Note that in the case where r > 2 

, an induction argument would be inappropriate because there
could be an innite number of pools.
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liability and the cross-subsidies between borrowers inside the pool (from higher-quality to
lower-quality ones) will imply that l < 1  z. This reects an important externality in our
model. Whenever there is some pooling between borrowers, there will be cross-subsidies
from borrowers of higher quality to the borrowers of lower quality. This generates an
ine¢ cient liquidation policy, as some ine¢ cient projects are not liquidated due to this
implicit subsidy.
Proposition 3 allows us to focus on the case l  p. First note that in the case that
l = 0, it is trivial that the optimal choice of p is p = 0, and overall welfare in this case is
W = 1 + y = 2z   1 (this is simply the average surplus generated by a project, given that
all types of projects will be pursued).
Alternatively, it may be optimal to choose an interior l (i.e., between zero and one). In
this case, we can characterize l by noting that two conditions must be satised. First, by
denition, a borrower of type l must be indi¤erent between liquidating or continuing with
the project; that is,
0 = (B + l   q   r(p  l)). (3)
In addition, banks need to break even on average, and so
D = p+ q + (1  )1 + l
2
. (4)
Note that the indi¤erence condition (3) implies that B +  > q for every  > l, and so it
is appropriate to write the break-even condition as above in (4), being sure that the loan
will be fully repaid if the contract is successful for every borrowing type.
Substituting for q from (4) into (3), we obtain the following expression for l:
l =
 + 2p(r   1)  1  2y
 + 2r + 1
. (5)
We characterize the equilibrium p, under the assumption that both the optimal p and
l are interior. Having done so, it is easy to verify conditions under which this is indeed the
case and then go on to consider outcomes when these conditions fail.
Continuing under the assumption that l is interior, we consider the rst-order condi-
tion, and we maximize total welfare in order to nd the contract o¤ered in the optimal
equilibrium (other equilibria exist but, as discussed at the end of Section 3.1, we focus
attention on the most e¢ cient equilibrium). We begin with the expression of total welfare.
19
W =
1Z
l
(2x+ B  D)dx  (r   1)
pZ
l
(p  x)dx
= y   ly   l2 + 1  1
2
(r   1)(p  l)2. (6)
The rst integral represents the net (positive or negative) welfare from each project -
nanced, while the second integral is the welfare loss from ine¢ cient borrowing. Note that
the above expression (in the upper limit of the second integral) supposes that p < 1, which
it will be easy to verify as true in equilibrium.
The rst-order condition that characterizes the optimal p is:
dW
dp
= ( y   2l) dl
dp
  (r   1)(p  l)(1  dl
dp
) = 0, (7)
where, by taking the derivative of l, as dened in equation (5), with respect to p:
dl
dp
=
2(r   1)
2r + 1 + 
. (8)
Note that this derivative is strictly positive since r > 1. One might expect this to be the
case because, as the interim payment increases, concealing a low type becomes more costly
and so more projects might be liquidated at t = 1=2.
Substituting expression (8) into (7) yields the following equilibrium expression for the
optimal p:
p =
l   2y   l
3 + 
. (9)
We solve simultaneously for l and p from this equation and equation (5) to obtain:
l =
2   2y   4ry + 2   3  2y
6 + 8r + 2 + 1
, (10)
and
p =
2 + 1  4y   2   4ry
6 + 8r + 2 + 1
. (11)
Substituting these expressions into equation (6), we can calculate a value WI for welfare.
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The notation WI is intended to highlight that this is the welfare under the optimal interior
solution when it is feasible. However, this need not be the global optimum since choosing
p = 0 = l and generating an expected surplus of 1 + y is always feasible.
The equilibrium expression for p, Equation (11), together with the break-even condition,
Equation (4), and the expression for l, Equation (10), determine the equilibrium value for
the second payment q.
Proposition 5 Both l and p are interior when   (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) > y and WI  1 + y.
Proof. Note that p is linear in y. It is su¢ cient, therefore, to consider the two extremes
y =  2 and y = 0: For y =  2, p = 1. For y = 0, p = (1 )2
6+8r+2+1
which is greater than
0 and less than 1. Furthermore for y =  2, l = 1 and l > 0 as long as   (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) > y.
For values of y higher than   (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) , the optimal contract is to set p = 0, which
leads to l = 0.
Thus   (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) > y is required for an interior l and p to be feasible. An interior
l would generate more surplus and so would be the equilibrium outcome when the wel-
fare generated is higher than the next best alternativechoosing l = 0 and p = 0, or,
equivalently, WI  1 + y.
Note that for y =  2, both   (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) > y and WI  1+ y hold as strict inequalities,
and so in particular for small enough z, both l and p will be interior.
Equations (10) and (11) show that in the parameter range where l is interior, both l
and p are linear and decreasing in y. That they should be decreasing is quite intuitive.
As y goes up, the least e¢ cient and all other projects become more and more attractive,
so the optimal rst payment p goes down to decrease the liquidation threshold l. On the
other hand, as y goes down, fewer projects should be funded, so p goes up. Further, as y
decreases, the parameters are more likely to be such that the optimal choice of l is interior
and, in particular, this is always the case when y =  2. This is proved explicitly as Lemma
6 in the Appendix.
Corollary 2 There are parameter values for which, in equilibrium, there are borrowers
who simultaneously borrow from both the bank and the hidden lender
Proof. Proposition 5 states that there are parameter values for which l and p are interior.
In this case, l and p take values as given by expressions (11) and (10). Note that p > l since
the expression 
2+1 4y 2 4ry
6+8r+2+1
> 2 2y 4ry+
2 3 2y
6+8r+2+1
can be simplied as (4 + 2y)(1  
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) > 0, which is always true. Since p > l, borrowers need to borrow from the hidden source
to satisfy the rst payment.
Note that Corollary 2 is related to Proposition 3. However, whereas Proposition 3
shows that l  p so that lowest type to liquidate never consumes in the interim period,
Corollary 2 demonstrates that when types are uniformly distributed there are parameter
values for which l < p. There are some entrepreneurs who simultaneously borrow from
both the bank and the hidden lender.
3.3.2 Equilibrium summary
There are three equilibrium regimes. When the hidden lender is relatively ine¢ cient (r >
2 
 ), there is full separation, where each type of borrower who does not liquidate pays an
interim payment equal to the interim cashow, p = , and a corresponding second-period
payment that accurately assesses the credit-worthiness of the borrower, q = D  (1 ) .
Entrepreneurs get nanced as long as  >  y2 ; equivalently, projects are nanced if and
only if they are e¢ cient. In this region, bank contracts have interest rates between period 1
and period 2 that are contingent on interim payments, with lower interest rates associated
with higher interim payments. These allow the bank to perfectly elicit information about
the borrowers type.
Instead of interpreting the contract as a long-term contingent contract with a menu of
di¤erent schedules, one could interpret it as an uncontingent contract that species max-
imum repayment p = 1 (the maximum level that can be paid without hidden borrowing)
that is renegotiated after the borrower learns its type. Along these lines, the fully separat-
ing equilibrium would be a situation where the endogenous costs of renegotiation are low.
That is, small changes in the actual payment p lead to small changes in q.
When the informal sector is relatively e¢ cient (r < 2  ), pooling cannot be avoided,
and in equilibrium only one contract is taken up from the banking sector. A single interest
rate is applied to all the borrowers, and the existence of cross-subsidies from higher types
to lower ones induces too little liquidation. There are two cases to consider.
If the average project is relatively protable (  (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) > y), the welfare loss from
funding ine¢ cient projects is smaller than is the loss from forcing some borrowers to borrow
from the opaque sector. Therefore, it is optimal to fund all projects, and in this case there
is no interim payment (p = 0 and q = 2D 1+2 ).
Finally, if the average project is relatively unprotable (  (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) > y and WI > 1+
y), the equilibrium will see some types of projects liquidated (l = 2+
2 3 2y 2y 4ry
6+8r+2+1
). All
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types that do not liquidate will make an interim payment to the bank and a corresponding
second-period payment that takes into account the information implied by the equilibrium
liquidation policy (p = 
2+1 4y 2 4ry
6+8r+2+1
and q =
D p (1 ) l+1
2
 ). In this case, some
borrowers borrow simultaneously from both sectors. Both sources of ine¢ ciency operate
in this regime namely, some ine¢ cient projects are conducted, and there is some costly
borrowing from the ine¢ cient opaque lender. The bank contract is determined by optimally
trading o¤ these two sources of ine¢ ciency.
Again, if the contract is interpreted as an uncontingent one that gets renegotiated, this
situation can also be interpreted as a case where renegotiation is (endogenously) costly.
Any deviation from p would lead to liquidation.
All three regions are non-trivial, as shown in the diagram below, which illustrates these
three equilibrium regions for a general .
r
z0
(1-v)/v
Fully separating contracts
11/2
Interior p
p=0
0
No projects
efficient
All projects
efficient
Cheaper
hidden
borrowing
More
expensive
hidden
borrowing
Equilibrium regimes
These three regions illustrate the main results of the paper. In the absence of a hidden
lender (or when its interest rate is too high), banks can use interim payments to extract
information about their borrowers. This information allows the banking sector to sort
creditworthiness more e¤ectively and leads to e¢ cient liquidation policies. However, when
the hidden lender is more e¢ cient, its presence alters the contracts that the banks can
feasibly sustain. The interest rate of loans does not vary with interim payments (and so only
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one level of interim payments is observed), and banks are less able to distinguish between
types of borrowers. Two ine¢ ciencies are at work. First, some borrowers simultaneously
borrow from banks and the hidden lender; if the hidden lender is ine¢ cient, this leads to
a welfare loss. Second, there are cross-subsidies between borrowers, with higher-quality
borrowers paying a too large interest rate for their bank loans and lower-quality borrowers
getting interest rates below the break-even rate that would apply to them under perfect
information. This leads to an ine¢ cient liquidation policy; too many projects are funded
and not liquidated. While a low (high) rst payment improves (worsens) the ine¢ ciency
associated with borrowing from the hidden source, it makes the liquidation policies less
(more) e¢ cient. The chosen rst payment, therefore, optimally solves the trade-o¤between
these two ine¢ ciencies.
In the next section, we explore in more detail the welfare implications of di¤erent levels
of ine¢ ciency of the hidden lender.
3.3.3 Comparative statics on welfare
First note that when r > 2  , welfare is rst best and independent of r within this range.
In the case where the optimal contract involves p = 0, welfare is equal to (1 + y). Again,
within this range welfare is independent of r. Raising r to a level where either an interior
p is optimal (which requires WI > 1+y) or the full separation equilibrium is attained (and
the rst best level of welfare is achieved), trivially raises welfare.
The most interesting analysis is for parameters in the region with a single interior
interim payment to the bank that is, where r  2  . Raising r so that the equilibrium
shifts to the fully separating case, which is rst best, trivially raises welfare. We now
consider how welfare varies with r within this region.
Having obtained explicit characterizations of l and p in terms of the exogenous para-
meters of the model and noting that welfare in this region is given by Equation (6), we
consider the comparative statics of welfare. It is of particular interest to consider how
welfare changes (and the channels through which it changes) as r, the exogenous rate of
interest in the opaque sector, varies.
First note that in the range r < 2  and for   (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) > y and WI  1 + y.
dl
dr
=
4(3 + )(1  )(2 + y)
(6 + 8r + 2 + 1)2
> 0. (12)
In particular, this suggests that one source of ine¢ ciency is reduced since as r increases,
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l rises and so fewer ine¢ cient projects are conducted.
Note also that
dp
dr
=   4(1  )
2(2 + y)
(6 + 8r + 2 + 1)2
< 0. (13)
As the interim payment falls, and since the lowest type that borrows rises, the amount
of borrowing from the opaque sector falls; however, since the cost of borrowing from the
opaque sector rises, the welfare consequences may be ambiguous. By examining welfare
directly we can see that the rst of these two e¤ects always dominates, as shown in Propo-
sition 6.
Note that the welfare as dened in Equation (6) does not take into account surplus
gained by the alternative sector.20 Including this surplus in the welfare calculation would
suggest that the only source of ine¢ ciency would be ine¢ cient liquidation and so only the
rst e¤ect would apply. The qualitative results would be unchanged welfare increases in
r. The analysis here would still be of interest, inasmuch as Equation (6) captures consumer
surplus.
Proposition 6 Welfare is non-decreasing in the hidden lenders rate (dWdr  0) and strictly
increasing when the lenders rate is su¢ ciently low (r < 2  ) and the proportion of ine¢ -
cient projects is high (   (3+)(1 )2(1++2r) > y and WI > 1 + y).
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Partially Hidden Borrowing
We modify the model slightly to allow for a partially hidden lender. We introduce the pos-
sibility that the banking sector observes the level of hidden borrowing by the entrepreneur
with some probability (1 h). With probability h, borrowing from the non-banking sector
remains hidden. A rationale for this modeling assumption is that the banking sector inves-
tigates each of its borrowers and obtains full information about the borrowing position of
each of them with some probability (1  h). Once a borrower is successfully investigated,
its borrowing position with all possible alternative lenders is perfectly known by the whole
banking sector. On the contrary, if a particular borrower is not investigated, the banking
sector cannot observe any borrowing outside the pool of competitive creditors and is aware
of the possibility of some additional lending.
20Recall, the banking sector is competitive and earns no surplus in expectation.
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If a borrower is investigated, we assume that the borrower is aware of it, and that she
has the opportunity to repay the opaque sector immediately. Early repayment entails a
cost sd, where d is the amount borrowed from the opaque sector and s < r since repayment
is early.21
If a borrower is investigated and repays early, then we know that full separation holds.
By the proof of Proposition 1, if the full separation contract is o¤ered, then there are no
incentives to imitate downwards. With observable payo¤s, there is no feasible way to imitate
upwards as banks would take into account any ine¢ cient borrowing and discount it when
calculating the borrowers true type. Given that the incentive-compatibility constraints
for the fully revealing equilibrium hold and that this equilibrium achieves rst best, it
is the only equilibrium in the continuation following the event that a borrower has been
investigated.
We make the following assumption to guarantee that early repayment is the optimal
borrowers strategy once the alternative lender becomes transparent:
Assumption 8 s < r   1
Lemma 4 Once the hidden borrowing is observed, early repayment is the borrowers opti-
mal strategy.
Proof. Borrowing from a hidden source gives no concealment benet, so the only benet
from that borrowing comes from either investing or consuming those funds. Investing them
at the gross market interest rate of 1 or consuming them gives a (non positive) expected
utility of 1 r. This loss has to be compared with the cost of early repayment  s. Early
repayment is, therefore, the optimal strategy as long as  s > 1  r, which is guaranteed
by Assumption 8.
The model with probabilistic observability of the hidden borrowing is, therefore, like a
switching model in which, with probability (1  h) full separation is achieved for sure, and
with probability h the model looks like that of the previous sections. In this latter case,
the only di¤erence is that, from the borrowers point of view, the costs and benets of the
hidden borrowing need to be recalculated since, with probability (1 h), hidden borrowing
is useless and entails a cost s.
In fact, once the alternative borrowing remains hidden, the rest of the model with
probabilistic observation of the hidden borrowing can be fully solved by realizing that,
21We do not explicitly model where the funds to repay s come from. Note, however, that any repayment
at t = 1 can be funded by issuing junior bank debt (which would be observable) with an interest rate 1

.
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in e¤ect, the cost of borrowing from the hidden source is now hr+(1 h)sh instead of just
r. Borrowing one unit from the hidden source costs r with probability h and costs s
with probability (1  h). It only produces some concealment benet to the borrower with
probability h, so the whole cost has to be re-scaled by h.
We write r(h; s) = hr+(1 h)sh as the e¤ective interest rate when borrowing from the
opaque sector remains hidden with probability h, the rate of interest is r when borrowing
remains hidden, and the cost of early repayment when the banking sector observes the
borrowing is s. With this notation, we obtain the following results, which are similar to
those in the fully hidden case:
Proposition 7 When the opaque sector lends at a su¢ ciently high e¤ective interest rate
(r(h; s) > 2  ), then there exists an equilibrium where consumers o¤er the menu fp(); q()g
with p() =  and q() = D  (1 ) and there is no borrowing from the hidden sector.
When the opaque sector lends at a su¢ ciently low e¤ective interest rate (r(h; s)  2  ), all
types that do not liquidate make the same interim payment p and owe the same amount,
q, to the bank in period 2.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the ones in Propositions 1 and 4, except that now
borrowing from the hidden source entails higher costs, and so further details are omitted.
The functional form of the welfare equation and the incentive-compatibility conditions
are similar to those of the basic model, so similar results to those of Section 3.3.1 hold. In
particular, if r(h; s)  2  , the only possible equilibrium is one with full pooling, and if
the optimal solution is interior, then the optimal rst payment is:
p =
2 + 1  4y   2   4yr(h; s)
6 + 8r(h; s) + 2 + 1
(14)
and the type of borrower who is just indi¤erent between liquidating the project and con-
tinuing it is:
l =
2   2y   2y + 4r(h; s) + 2   3
6 + 8r(h; s) + 2 + 1
. (15)
Total welfare in this regime can be expressed as:
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W =
h
24 1Z
l
(2x+ B  D)dx  (r   1)
pZ
l
(p  x)dx
35
+(1  h)
264 1Z
  y
2
(2x+ B  D)dx  s
pZ
l
(p  x)dx
375 .
(16)
The rst term corresponds to the welfare when the hidden sector remains hidden, while
the second one is related to when it becomes observable. The above expression can be
rearranged as
W = h
24 1Z
l
(2x+ B  D)dx  (vr(h; s)  1)
pZ
l
(p  x)dx
35+(1 h)
264 1Z
  y
2
(2x+ B  D)dx
375 .
(17)
Note that the expression in the rst bracket is identical to the expression (6) in Section
3, with a change of the social cost of borrowing from r to r(h; s), and that the second
bracket is constant in p and l.
The welfare implications of the changes in the probability of the hidden sector becoming
transparent (1   h) are as follows: A higher (1   h) implies higher welfare in a couple of
ways. First is the automatic switching from the pooling equilibrium to the rst-best full
separation equilibrium whenever the banking sector observes the hidden lending. Second,
increasing (1 h) increases r(h; s), and so the results on welfare increasing in r from Section
3 apply. Similarly, an increase in s raises r(h; s) and so also raises welfare.
Note that our analysis is related to the literature on the interactions between direct
screening of lenders through active investigation and the indirect screening that can be
achieved by o¤ering them a menu of contracts, as in Manove et al. (2001). While in most
models these are seen as substitutes, in our model they are complements. That is, an
increase in (1   h) leads to more information about some borrowers directly and also to
a more informative equilibrium with respect to the other borrowers (who may have loans
from the alternative sector that remain hidden).22
22Even though, so far, we have considered h as an exogenous parameter, endogenizing it seems relatively
straightforward. We could allow banks to choose their monitoring e¤ort h at a cost. Higher transparency
(lower h) would be more costly, and competition among banks should equalize the marginal cost of additional
monitoring (reducing h) with its marginal gain in terms of welfare in equilibrium.
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5 Conclusions
We have presented a model in which a banking sector and an alternative opaque source of
lending coexist. The results show that if the alternative source of borrowing is su¢ ciently
ine¢ cient, banking contracts will achieve rst-best. The optimal contract gives incentives
to borrowers to reveal their intermediate cash ows perfectly by rewarding higher interim
payments with lower future interest rates. However, if the alternative source of borrowing
is relatively e¢ cient, then the fully contingent contract is not sustainable, as borrowers
may want to conceal their types by borrowing from the hidden source and repaying a
larger part of their loans early. Here, the optimal contract is less contingent on the interim
payments of the loans, as types cannot be fully inferred from interim payments. Assuming
that types are uniformly distributed allows us to fully characterize an equilibrium in which
there is only one possible rst payment and associated second payment. The contract fails
to achieve rst-best for two reasons. First, a number of projects which should be e¢ ciently
liquidated at an early stage are instead continued, and, second, some borrowers access the
ine¢ cient alternative sector. Second, for some parameters, this rst payment would be
zero and all repayment would be in the nal period. Thus, the model can also be seen as
characterizing the timing of debt repayments.
It is worth restating that the banks, even though they may be more e¢ cient, cannot
simply replicate the loans provided by the hidden sector. This follows since it is assumed
that a bank is committed to share all information about its loans to other banks. In
principle, one might think that the bank could o¤er two types of credit and commit not
to act on the information revealed. However, even if the commitment were credible, this
arrangement would lead to cross-subsidies among borrowers that would be observed by
other banks, and so the bank o¤ering this arrangement would su¤er from cream-skimming
and, consequently, su¤er losses.
We show that overall welfare increases if the cost of borrowing from the opaque sector
rises. This result is in contrast to some conventional wisdom in discussions of developing
economies, which focuses on the role that the informal sector may play in alleviating
the nancing constraints. The informal sector lends to rms and households when the
formal sector is rationing them.23 However, in our model, as the informal sector gets more
23Jain (1999), who also discusses related literature, provides an explanation for the observation of bor-
rowers in both sectors based on a trade-o¤ between the formal sectors lower opportunity cost of funds and
the informal sectors better information. Instead, we assume that the formal sector is unambiguously more
e¢ cient and that the informal sector may or may not have an informational advantage.
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e¢ cient, the banking sector has to o¤er a less contingent contract, and total welfare falls.
This follows naturally and is intuitive given that we consider the interaction between formal
and informal sectors from an informational point of view.
Relaxing the assumption that the alternative sector is not entirely opaque makes it less
appealing for a borrower to use the costly alternative sector to disguise her type, as this
may turn out to be ine¤ective. In this case, the qualitative results outlined above carry
through in this richer environment and, moreover, welfare is decreasing in the opacity of
the informal sector. These results suggest that as the informational transparency of the
nancial sector as a whole improves, banks are able to o¤er more sophisticated nancial
instruments.
While we presented a model of nancing for an investment project, the central mech-
anisms and, in particular, the interaction of di¤erent sources of borrowing and the im-
plications for contractual form have wide applicability. Our results highlight that one of
the possible reasons that long-term debt contracts are inexible with respect to interim
payments is that the information that long-term lenders would extract from these interim
payments would be corrupted by additional borrowing from hidden sources of funds. Our
results also suggest an explanation for simultaneous borrowing from di¤erent sources, even
when there is an apparently clear pecking order among them and the borrowing from the
cheaper source is not fully exhausted (for example, rm loans and trade credit or mort-
gages and credit card borrowing when both trade credit and credit card borrowing are not
costlessly observable to the bank). Finally, we also show that the existence of an alter-
native opaque source of borrowing may diminish welfare because it may distort the set of
contracts that the competitive lending sector might o¤er.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Suppose that borrowers face the choice between two generic contracts a and b and without
loss of generality, we label them so that pa > pb. The following possibilities are exhaustive:
(i)  > pa >  > pb > 
(ii) pa > pb >  >  > 
(iii)  >  >  > pa > pb
(iv)  > pa > pb >  > 
(v)  >  > pa > pb > 
In cases (ii), (iii) and (v), the conditions for a borrower of type  to prefer a repayment of
schedule a to one of type b are identical to the conditions for a borrower of type . It remains to
consider cases of type (i) and (iv).
In Case (i) a borrower of type  prefers schedule a to schedule b whenever
(qb   qa)  (pa   pb)(1 + ) + r(pa   ), (18)
and a borrower of type  prefers schedule b to schedule a whenever the following condition is
satised:
  pb + (B +   pb   qb)    pa + (B +   pa   qa), (19)
or, equivalently, (qb   qa)  (pa   pb)(1 + ), which contradicts (18).
Finally, in Case (iv), the condition for a type  borrower to prefer the b schedule is (qb  
qa)  (pa   pb)(1 + ), and the condition for a type  borrower to prefer the a schedule is that
(qb   qa)  (pa   pb)(1 +  + r). These conditions are mutually incompatible.
In all cases, therefore, it cannot be that a borrower of type  >  strictly prefers the schedule
with the rst payment pb < pa and the borrower of type  prefers the schedule with the rst
payment pa. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. To show that with r < 2  there cannot be an equilibrium where a continuum of borrowers
are able to separate, we proceed in a similar fashion as with the proof of Proposition 1 and show
that if two borrowers that are arbitrarily close to each other are able to separate, we reach a
contradiction.
We start by conjecturing an equilibrium menu that achieves the separation of some borrowers in
a continuum and then pick two arbitrarily close borrowers  and 0 with  < 0 and p() 6= p(0).
The corresponding break-even second payments q() = D p() (1 ) and q(
0) = D p(
0) (1 )0
 .
We know by Lemma 3 that p() < p(0). These payment schedules have to fulll similar incentive-
compatibility conditions to the ones shown in Proposition 1.
In particular, we can dene the two conditions as:
IC1: no borrower of a higher type (0) wants to imitate a borrower of a lower type ().
IC2: No borrower of a lower type () wants to imitate a borrower of a higher type (0).
If there is a continuum of borrowers that can individually separate, at least one of the following
situations must be true.
a) At least two arbitrarily close borrowers are neither consuming nor borrowing at t = 1
b) At least two arbitrarily close borrowers are both consuming t = 1
c) At least two arbitrarily close borrowers are both borrowing at t = 1
We analyse each of this situations in turn.
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a) This part of the equilibrium is characterized by Proposition 1, and we know that IC2 cannot
hold in this situation if r < 2  .
b) Suppose that there is a borrower 0 that fully separates from the rest and is able to consume at
t = 1 (that is p(0) < 0. Then there must be a borrower , such that  < 0, that is also able to pay
p(0) without borrowing. The utility of borrower  of claiming his own type is (B D p() (1 ) +
)+ ( p()) and the utility of imitating borrower 0 is (B  D p(0) (1 )0 +)+ ( p(0)).
The necessary and su¢ cient condition for IC2 to hold is therefore:
(B   D   p()  (1  )

+ ) + (  p()) > (B   D   p(
0)  (1  )0

+ ) + (  p(0)),
which simplies to: (1  )(  0) > 0, which is always false, so we reach a contradiction.
c) In this case we start by exploring IC2.
A borrower of a lower type would have a utility of ((B   D p() (1 ) + )  r(p()  )),
while claiming to be a higher-type borrower would yield her a utility of (B  D p(0) (1 )0 + 
r(p(0)  )). Subtracting the rst term from the second we get a condition that must be smaller
than zero for IC2 to hold.
(B D   p(
0)  (1  )0

 r(p(0) )+) ((B D   p()  (1  )

) r(p() )+)) < 0,
which can be simplied as (1  )(0   ) + (1  r)(p(0)  p())) < 0.
However, in this case IC1 becomes:
(B D   p(
0)  (1  )0

 r(p(0) 0)+0) ((B D   p()  (1  )

) r(p() 0)+0)) > 0.
This expression simplies to (1 )(0 )+(1 r)(p(0) p())) > 0 which is exactly the opposite
condition to the one necessary for IC2. Therefore, when two arbitrarily close borrowers borrow and
achieve separation, IC1 and IC2 are mutually incompatible, which poses a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Suppose that this result is false; then there must be at least
two types that pay di¤erent amounts. We focus on the highest two payments (and by Lemma 3
these will correspond to the highest di¤ering types). We will nd that in equilibrium, the top two
pools would rather be combined as a single pool. Then, an induction argument for a nite number
of pools will imply that one overall pool appears as the equilibrium contract, as there cannot be
any top two pools.
We continue by considering the top two pools of types that do not liquidate.
First note that if any type  strictly prefers not to liquidate, then all types  >  would prefer
to mimic  than to liquidate. Thus, in restricting attention to the highest two payments p1 <
p2 and associated types (and by Lemma 3 we know that higher types are associated with higher
payments), we can be sure that there are some 1  2 such that types (1; 2] pay p1 in the rst
period (with the associated q1) and (2; 1] pay p2 in the rst period (with the associated q2 in the
second period).
The resulting contradiction is somewhat involved, but the structure is as follows. First, we
highlight a number of possible cases. In each case, we seek to determine the optimal choice of 2
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(and associated p1 and p2) given that there are two pools in the range (1; 1] while keeping 1
indi¤erent (and so all other types below may also remain with their existing contracts, and there
are no changes to equilibrium or welfare consequences from types below 1).24
By denition, p2 > p1. There are a number of cases to consider:
I p2  1 and p1  2
II p2  1 and 2  p1  1
III p2  1 and 1  p1
IV 1  p2  2 and p1  2  1
V 1  p2  2 and 2  p1  1
VI 1  p2  2 and 1  p1
We focus on each case in turn and show that the optimum outcome in all cases pushes 2
into a corner. This necessarily implies that the equilibrium 2 that maximizes welfare is such that
2 2 f1; 1; p2g. The rst two options 2 2 f1; 1g contradict the assumption that there are two
distinct pools of borrowers. To complete the proof we nally suppose that 2 = p2 and show that
this, too, leads to a contradiction. So all the possible cases lead to a contradiction. By induction,
if the top two pools cannot exist, the only possible equilibrium with a nite number of pools is one
with only one pool.
Lemma 5 In the conjectured equilibrium 2 = p1
Proof. Note, rst, that in equilibrium, the break-even conditions imply that q1 =
D p1 (1 )1+22

and q2 =
D p2 (1 ) 1+22
 .
We proceed by examining each of the cases highlighted above in turn.
Case I p2  1 and p1  2
The incentive-compatibility condition for a borrower of type 2 that ensures that she prefers
the schedule (p2; q2) to (p1; q1) is:
(B + 2   q2   r(p2   2))  (B + 2   q1   r(p1   2)), (20)
which yields q1   q2  rp2   rp1. Substituting in for q1 and q2 and simplifying yields p2 
1 
r 1
1 1
2 +p1. Note that since borrowing is ine¢ cient, in equilibrium, p2 will be as low as possible
and, in particular, the constraint will bind and these conditions will hold with equality. In particular,
note that this implies that dp2d2 =
dp1
d2
.
The relevant constraint for a borrower of type 1 is that the borrower is kept at a given level
of utility, which we arbitrarily label k:
(B + 1   q1   r(p1   1)) = k. (21)
We can rearrange Equation (21) to obtain the following expression for p1:
p1 =
1
r   1( k + B  D + (1  )
1 + 2
2
+ (1 + r)1). (22)
It follows that dp2d2 =
dp1
d2
= 1 2(r 1) .
24While noting that su¢ ciently bizarre o¤-equilibrium beliefs could justify a wide range of equilibria, we
focus on the most e¢ cient equilibrium outcome (which would also be the one preferred by the borrowers).
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Given these expressions for p1 and p2, we can substitute them into the expression for welfare
and maximize welfare with respect to 2 to determine its equilibrium value. Specically, consider
overall welfare
W =
Z 1
1
(B  D + 2x)dx  (r   1)
Z 2
1
(p1   x)dx  (r   1)
Z 1
2
(p2   x)dx+ cst, (23)
where the nal constant term arises from the welfare of those types  < 1. It can be determined
that
dW
d2
= (r   1)(p2   p1) = 1  
2
(1  1)). (24)
Note that dWd2 is independent of 2 and so it is either always positive or always negative, and so
either 2 = 1, which violates the assumption that there are two distinct pools, or else 2 = p1.
Case II p2  1 and 2  p1  1
The incentive-compatibility condition for a borrower of type 2, as above, will bind and is given
by:
(B + 2   q2   r(p2   2)) = (2   p1) + (B + 2   q1). (25)
Substituting for q1 and q2 and rearranging yields p2 = 2 +
(1 )(1 1)
2(r 1) . In particular, note that
dp2
d2
= 1.
The constraint for a borrower of type 1 is given by
(B + 1   q1   r(p1   1)) = k. (26)
Substituting for q1 and rearranging yields p1 = 1r 1 ( k + B  D + (1  )1+22 + (1 + r)1)
and note, in particular, that dp1d2 =
1 
2(r 1) > 0.
Next, we turn to welfare and maximizing with respect to 2 allows us to characterize the
equilibrium level of 2. Overall welfare is given by:
W =
Z 1
1
(B  D + 2x)dx  (r   1)
Z p1
1
(p1   x)dx  (r   1)
Z 1
2
(p2   x)dx+ cst, (27)
and, in particular,
dW
d2
= (r   1)(p2   1  1  
2(r   1)(p1   1)), (28)
where p2 and p1 are functions of 2 and dened above.
We must verify that the appropriate second-order condition holds, and to this end note that
d2W
d22
= (r   1)(1  ( 1  
2(r   1))
2). (29)
It follows that the rst-order condition dWd2 = 0 denes a maximum if and only if 1 < (
1 
2(r 1) )
2
or, equivalently, r < 3 2 . In particular, when r >
3 
2 , then 1 >
1 
2(r 1) and so setting
dW
d2
= 0
denes a minimum and so the maximum must be at a corner: that is, the equilibrium value of 2
is either 1, which violates the assumption of two distinct pools, or p1.25
25Note that it is possible to have full separation with 1 = 1 only in the case that the top pool is
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In the subcase when r < 3 2 , the rst-order condition does indeed dene a maximum rather
than a minimum; however, we argue that this case is vacuous. Recall that p1 < 2 < 1; we also
know, following Equation (26), that 1 satises p1 = 1r 1 ( k+B D+(1 )1+22 +(1+r)1).
Rearranging this last expression, we obtain that:
p1   1
r   1( k + B  D) 
1  
(r   1)
2
2
= 1
2r + 1 + 
2(r   1) . (30)
Further p1 < 2 (by assumption in this Case), (B   D) < 0 and k  0, since bringing together
constraint (26) for a borrower of type 1 and the assumption that she prefers to continue than to
liquidate. Bringing together these observations with Equation (30), it follows that 1 2r+1+2(r 1) <
2  1 (r 1) 22 ; rearranging, we obtain 1 < ( 2(r 1) 1+1++2r )2. Given that 2(r 1) 1+ < 0 when
r < 3 2 , then 1 < 0, which is impossible and so the sub-case where r <
3 
2 is indeed vacuous.
Case III p2  1 and 1  p1
The incentive-compatibility condition for a borrower of type 2 is given by Equation (25), which
yields p2 = 2 +
(1 )(1 1)
2(r 1) .
The participation constraint for a borrower of type 1 is:
1   p1 + (B + 1   q1) = k. (31)
Substituting for q1, we obtain
1 + B  D + (1  )1 + 2
2
= k. (32)
Note that p1 does not appear in this expression; neither does it appear (neither implicitly
through p2 nor explicitly) in the expression for welfare, which in this case is given by:
W =
Z 1
1
(B  D + 2x)dx  (r   1)
Z 1
2
(p2   x)dx+ cst. (33)
Thus p1 is unconstrained, and does not a¤ect welfare. Without loss of generality, therefore, we
can take the limiting case that p1 = 1.
Case IV 1  p2  2 and p1  2  1
The incentive-compatibility condition for a borrower of type 2 is just as in Case I, as given by
Equation (20) and, in particular, dp2d2 =
dp1
d2
.
The participation constraint for a borrower of type 1 is as in Equation (21) and so, in particular,
dp1
d2
= 1 2(r 1) .
Noting that dp2d2 =
dp1
d2
= 1 2(r 1) , and that welfare in this case is given by
W =
Z 1
1
(B  D + 2x)dx  (r   1)
Z 2
1
(p1   x)dx  (r   1)
Z p2
2
(p2   x)dx+ cst, (34)
innitesimally thin the full separation case; but with a nite number of pools, such an outcome is ruled
out.
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we can write
dW
d2
=  (r   1)p1   1  
2(r   1)1 + (r   1)p2(2 
1  
2(r   1)). (35)
Since this expression is independent of 2, welfare is monotonic in 2 and takes its maximal
value at an extremal value for 2, that is, either at 2 = 1, or at 2 = minfp1; p2g. In the latter
case that 2 = minfp1; p2g, the analysis of Case V applies.
Case V 1  p2  2 and 2  p1  1
The incentive-compatibility condition for a borrower of type 2 is just as in Case I, as given by
Condition (25) and in particular p2 = 2 +
(1 )(1 1)
2(r 1) and
dp2
d2
= 1.
The participation constraint for a borrower of type 1 is as in Equation (21) and so
dp1
d2
=
1 
2(r 1) .
Welfare in this case is given by
W =
Z 1
1
(B  D + 2x)dx  (r   1)
Z p1
1
(p1   x)dx  (r   1)
Z p2
2
(p2   x)dx+ cst, (36)
and so, using the expressions derived above for dp2d2 and
dp1
d2
, we can obtain:
dW
d2
=  1  
2
(p1   1) < 0, (37)
and so welfare is optimized (and the equilibrium value of 2 is chosen) where 2 is as low as
possible that is, where 2 = p1.
Case VI 1  p2  2 and 1  p1
The incentive-compatibility condition for a borrower of type 2 is given by Equation (25), which
yields p2 = 2 +
(1 )(1 1)
2(r 1) .
The participation constraint for a borrower of type 1 is identical to that in Case III and, just as
in that case, p1 appears neither in this expression nor (neither implicitly through p2 nor explicitly)
in the expression for welfare. Without loss of generality therefore, we can take the limiting case
that p1 = 1.
Completing the proof
By Lemma 5 2 = p1, there are two possibilities to consider, either p2 > 1 or 1 > p2 > 2,
in both cases p2 > 2. We show that this is inconsistent with the maintained assumption that
1 > 2 > 1.
When p2 > 2 > 1, the incentive-compatibility condition for a borrower of type 2 is given
by Equation (25), which yields p2 = 2 +
(1 )(1 1)
2(r 1) .
The constraint for a borrower of type 1
(B + 1   q1   r(p1   1)) = k. (38)
Substituting for q1 and since p1 = 2, we obtain:
2 =
2B   2D   2k + 1 + 1 + 2r1
 + 2r   3 . (39)
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The case is not degenerate; that is, in equilibrium these top two pools do not collapse into one,
as long as 2 is interior. In particular, it must be that both 2 > 1 and 1 > 2. Specically,
substituting from (39) and rearranging 2 > 1 if and only if 1 > 12 (1 + k). Similarly, 2 < 1 if
and only if 1 < +2r 1+2k(1++2r) . For an interior solution 1 > 2 > 1, both conditions must hold and
in particular:
 + 2r   1 + 2k
(1 +  + 2r)
>
1
2
(1 + k), (40)
rearranging this is true if and only if k > 1. This is impossible the highest possible utility for
a borrower is for the best possible type (type 1) to be recognized as such, and in this case her
expected utility would be B   D + 1 + 1 = 1 and so it cannot be that k, which is the expected
utility for the 1 type, is greater than 1.
This nal contradiction completes the proof.
Lemma 6 The condition WI  1 + y is more likely to hold the smaller is y.
Proof. First note WI  1 + y if and only if
A =
 ( 2y + 2   2y   4ry + 2   3)(6 + 8r + 2 + 1)2y
 2( 2y + 2   2y   4ry + 2   3)2
 (r   1)( 4y   2   4ry + 2 + 1  ( 2y + 2   2y   4ry + 2   3))2
 0 (41)
Taking the derivative with respect to y yields
dA
dy
=   8(1  ) + 16r(1  )
2   8y   8ry   122 + 83
+24   48y2   8y3   112ry2   8ry3   64r2y2 + 2 (42)
Note that this expression is linear in y and in r and so dAdy takes its maximal value when y = 0 then
and when r tends to 1 when this value is
dA
dy
=  83 + 42 + 24   24   18, (43)
which it can be easily veried is non-positive in the range  2 (0; 1).
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. We begin by considering the parameter range r < 2  ,   (3+)(1 )2(1++r) > y and WI > 1 + y.
In this range W =WI .
Note that p  l = 2(1 )(2+y)6+8r+2+1 and so d(p l)dr =   16(1 )(2+y)(6+8r+2+1)2 . Next, by taking the derivative
of W with respect to r from Equation 6, we obtain:
dW
dr
=
dl
dr
( y   2l)  1
2
(p  l)2   (r   1)(p  l)d(p  l)
dr
. (44)
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Substituting in for dldr and
d(p l)
dr and simplifying:
dW
dr
=
4 + 162   403 + 164 + 45 + 32r2   64r3 + 32r4
2(6 + 8r + 2 + 1)3
(2 + y). (45)
The denominator of this expression is positive and (2 + y) > 0 and so dWdr has the same sign as the
numerator of the fraction. Specically,
sign(dWdr ) = sign(4 + 16
2   403 + 164 + 45 + 32r2   64r3 + 32r4)
= sign(1 + 4   102 + 43 + 4 + 8r   16r2 + 8r3) , (46)
where the second equality holds, since the sign of the factor (4) is positive. It follows that dWdr > 0
if and only if 1 + 4   102 + 43 + 4 + 8r   16r2 + 8r3 > 0, which is true if and only if:
1 + 4   102 + 43 + 4
162   8   83 > r. (47)
Note that 2  > r  1 and so dWdr > 0 requires
1 + 4   102 + 43 + 4
162   8   83 >
1

, (48)
or, equivalently,
43   22   12 + 4 + 9 > 0, (49)
which is always true for  in the range (0; 1).
Outside of the parameter range r < 2  ,   (3+)(1 )2(1++r) > y and WI > 1 + y, dWdr = 0 trivially
since W is independent of r.
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B Notation
The table below summarizes the key notation. The rst group are exogenous parameters (though
note that under the assumption that hidden lenders are perfectly competitive and are used only
for this purpose, r = 1 and  = 0 can be considered as endogenously determined parameters).
The second group are endogenously determined. Finally, the third group are exogenous parameters
relevant only for the partially hidden borrowing and the analysis of Section 4.
D funds required for the investment
 creditworthiness of the borrower
 probability that investment succeeds
z  1 + B D2 a measure of the average protability of projects
y  B  D the average return of the worst possible project
r interest rate charged by hidden lender
  r   1 markup of hidden lender above the break-even rate
d rst period borrowing from hidden lender
p rst period repayment to bank
q(p) (contingent) second period repayment to bank
l threshold type who liquidates the project early
W total ex-ante expected welfare
WI total ex-ante expected welfare when the solution is interior
h probability that partially hidden lender remains unobserved
s early repayment interest rate to partially hidden borrower
r(h; s)  hr+h(1 s)h e¤ectiveinterest rate from partially hidden borrower
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